Red, diamond and opale button thought experiments

 

The concept of a thought experiment with a red button that would annihilate all life when pressed emerged as part of the discussion of extinctionism. The most popular version of the experiment is to imagine a mechanism that, when activated, would immediately end all life in space. What should a person faced with such a choice do, what good arguments for each action can be distinguished, and how does the thought experiment relate to practical, present, and future actions, including the goals of advanced civilizations and superintelligence, remain unambiguously unresolved. If there was an option to eliminate only suffering, or only the desires that are its source, without the cosmic euthanasia of life, maybe another mechanism should be selected. Would it be a moral duty to save a life from an inevitable, completely natural catastrophe by pushing a button? Is the creation of a completely new universe subject to the same ethical judgment as not pressing a button? It would seem that there is a morally significant difference between not creating a new life and physically taking an existing life. In fact, the differences are significant, and they usually result from the adopted hierarchy of values ​​and more or less arbitrary assumptions. Indeed, I am convinced that it is precisely for the original set of assumptions about the value of life and the various forms of experience that play a key role here. I greatly respect coherent systems of assumptions, wholly whatever conclusions they lead to. I don't know if my system of assumptions is accurate. I think so at the moment. Certainly, regardless of the assumption system adopted, as long as suffering is seen as something of great value, as something that should be stopped, at least some of the proposed thought experiments and their variations may turn out to be thought-provoking.

The version of the red button originally presented by Gary Inmendham sounds more or less like this: if you, knowing the history of the earth, its evolution, and its nature, knowing that the most intelligent creature on earth is the great apes, and knowing with 100% certainty that never, and in any way, no higher intelligence would emerge on it. If you were out of the earth with a button in front of you that annihilates the earth instantly, would you press it? Would you feel comfortable knowing the amount of suffering you haven't prevented, allowing all the sentient life in the biosphere to torture and kill themselves the most sophisticated ways, only to die out eventually?

The second version, presented a moment later, is already slightly changed: A button does not exterminate everything, it only causes global sterilization. From now on, reproduction is not possible. Originally, only non-sentient beings remain, the last generation of animals is quietly dying out. We can assume that sentient beings will not rise again. Would you press that button?

Nothing seems to be said in the original version about the extinction of intelligence. The only intelligent element in the original experiment is a being with the choice of pressing the button.

Imagine another version. Earth is the only planet where life will ever develop. Nothing alive exists yet. By pressing a button you can stop life from being born of chemicals. Would you press that button?

If you could stop the universe from creating any kind of life, not only the earth but billions of other planets, from allowing the development of sentient creatures, would you do it?

Knowing that there is a completely natural phenomenon in the universe that prevents life from arising, and being able to stop it, just like that, with one choice, would you consider letting the universe be naturally empty the same thing as pressing a button that makes life never arise?

Depending on what we base our value system on, we can treat different versions of the thought experiment differently, depending on how much suffering is prevented, how much satisfaction is prevented, or what effect what we do will have on intelligent beings.

In the case of nature, the relationship between suffering and satisfaction is clear. The process of evolution is pointless, brutal, and cruel. There is no serious doubt that the amount of suffering contained in nature is many times greater than any pleasure felt by living creatures.

In the public discussion, if a red button thought experiment is already emerging, it is usually presented in a more controversial form, involving people. What if we could wipe out all existence in an instant, assuming that there is no life outside the earth? All life, all animals, including humans, would be unconsciously annihilated, and life would never appear again, in any way and any form? All future suffering and future satisfaction, along with all potential for their existence, would evaporate in a millisecond. Is it possible to justify not pressing a button? Is it possible to justify pressing it?

What if, in a totally deterministic universe, we were shown the future. Trillions of years of future lives, developing and dying civilizations, destroyed and renewed biospheres, tens of trillions of lives being born and dying in thousands of paradises and hells. All of this can be stopped at the cost of less suffering. When you press a button, there will be a hundred years of torture for any living being, with or without you, at will, but it will be a lot less suffering than if you didn't press the button. We can assume that the ratio of profit and loss would be the same if pleasure or fulfillment were treated as a positive value in itself. Is it possible to justify, not from a psychological but from an ethical point of view, not pressing a button? What if after pressing a button there was a minute of agony? What if the probability of causing pain was only at a certain level?

Here again, the answer depends on the assumptions we made. Surely a pure negative consequentialist should lean towards the option that causes less suffering, even if it were only a unit of measure less. The question comes down to specifying whether life has value, and more specifically what forms of conscious experience have what values.

A consistent approach to an experiment is often hampered by paying attention to things other than the final gains and loses ratio. According to some concepts, there is a possibility that the vacuum that makes up our universe is so-called false vacuum, unstable, and it is possible to collapse into a real vacuum. It can happen at any moment and in any place in the cosmos with some minimal probability. The resulting reaction propagates at the speed of light, creating bubbles in space. They are essentially death bubbles and this is also their name. Everything outside such a bubble is immediately annihilated when it comes into contact with a real vacuum. Suppose the earth is naturally annihilated in this way. There is no other possibility, every scenario of earth's life existence requires just such death, immediate, unconscious, and painless, for every being on the planet. Only by pressing a button, you can stop this scenario. When we press a button, it will never happen, and the universe will continue to function as it does now, with no signs of death bubbles and false vacuum decay. Would you press that button? Is it possible to convincingly justify pressing a button, or is it possible to justify not pressing it?

The end-of-life scenario with the push of a button is no different from not stopping a death bubble. The scenario of stopping the decay of the false vacuum is no other than letting the earth exist. What's the difference? Is the imaginary "no one has the right to decide for others", even when cosmic suffering is at stake, torture that no human mind can even imagine, a sufficient reason?

In addition to several versions of the red button experiment, other experiments have also been proposed. A green button would only eliminate suffering. I'll try to use another term, because the concept of the green button is not widely publicized yet, and the green button itself has already been used in another thought experiment where a person teleporting to Mars pushed the button, which resulted in her body disintegrating on the earth and reintegrating immediately on Mars. The question, in this case, is whether it is safe to press such a button. Therefore, for the description of an already known experiment, it will be more pleasant to imagine another button, especially since I would like to break the original version into two.

We have a red and an opal button in front of us. Red causes an immediate annihilation of all life, desires, and sufferings. Never again will no life appear in the abyss of space. The opal button causes an immediate annihilation of suffering itself. All desires can be fulfilled, the world becomes a paradise. As David Pearce writes in his hedonistic imperative: "The Hedonistic Imperative outlines how genetic engineering and nanotechnology will abolish suffering in all sentient life. The abolitionist project is hugely ambitious but technically feasible. It is also instrumentally rational and morally urgent. The metabolic pathways of pain and malaise evolved because they served the fitness of our genes in the ancestral environment. They will be replaced by a different sort of neural architecture - a motivational system based on heritable gradients of bliss. States of sublime well-being are destined to become the genetically pre-programmed norm of mental health. It is predicted that the world's last unpleasant experience will be a precisely dateable event. ". After pressing the opal button, the gradient of dissatisfaction and unfulfilled desires will be replaced by the gradient of bliss. From now on, the world will be full of happy, fulfilled beings. There will be no longer dissatisfaction and suffering. From a hedonistic perspective, this seems to be the most desirable future.

The hedonistic way of perceiving the world, therefore considering suffering as bad and pleasure as good, is not the only one, however. In 2017, Lukas Gloor coined the term tranquilism, rejecting philosophical hedonism. In a heuristic shortcut, satisfaction in the form of tranquility is posed here as good, while the existence of unfulfilled desires is an undesirable state. This view is not new, it was already presented in ancient Greece, and now, in some forms, it is the basis of Buddhism and other eastern philosophical and religious currents. The existence of the greatest paradise and the fulfillment of billions of desires is no better than an average life in which several dozen basic desires are absolutely and perfectly fulfilled, or a state of technological nirvana in which desires are eliminated to the maximum extent possible. It is not an active euphoria but peace, deep satisfaction that makes the state we are in is complete, 100% sufficient, is a goal worth achieving. From a subjective point of view, being fulfilled after realizing all dreams, experiencing all mystical exultations, and experiencing all the greatest loves is nothing better than a state of complete, undisturbed peace devoid of euphoria and mystical sensations, as both are complete satisfaction.

So, temporarily relinquishing hedonism, let us consider the idea of ​​a diamond, tranquilistic, button. Imagine that by pressing a diamond button we can make all metaphysical non-fulfillment disappear. In one moment, minds will be desireless by experiencing immediate enlightenment. Feeling pain will not imply suffering, and the minds of all sentient beings will only feel complete satisfaction. Contrary to the previous scenario, we are not dealing here with the fulfillment of desires, but with their elimination. The world might look like it always has, but pointlessness would no longer be essential, suffering would not exist, although the pain would not have to go away. Every living entity would be completely indifferent about what is going to happen to them since without any needs there would be no preferences. Mechanical reproduction, devouring, rape and murder, genocide, industrial farming, catastrophes, and torture would bring about the same amount of suffering as euphoria or the fulfillment of dreams that no longer exist. The second scenario is to get rid of even that, give up any lives, give up experiences that are already unnecessary and indifferent, and produce an equivalent of nirvana for each being. contemplating absolutely nothing for eternity, or to the end of the universe, as long as it gives us perfectly same amount of satisfaction as the wildest heavens, seem to be no worse, and maybe better, than living to fulfill new desires, even if the gradient of orgasmic bliss is what motivates sentience.

I'm pretty sure there would be a great number of people who would find the second scenario, as well as the sole idea of the diamond button unacceptable. The question is, why exactly would it be so? Eternal peace and satisfaction are in no way worse if we contemplate nothing than to experience cosmic love and fulfillment of desires guided by a gradient of bliss. Outlining the differences in the best possible worlds postulated by philosophical hedonism and tranquilism is an extensive topic that deserves its own discussion.

One can think of a situation in which the presented thought experiments cease to be fiction and become reality. At present, nothing seems to prevent advanced civilizations from creating simulated realities, and there are convincing arguments that we ourselves if we are one of the identical copies or a significant part of our measure if we accept some form of trans-world identity, are contained in simulations. The red button dilemma can actually be a real moral problem, in the distant future or at different levels of nested simulations. Civilizations that create simulations, perhaps future posthumans, or even our own civilization in the not-too-distant future, may find themselves in such a situation. what will they do? If we could turn the simulation off, would it be different from not creating it in the first place? If we could create simulations, would we treat that as a moral duty? Is it even justifiable to create a simulation in which there is suffering, even along with all fulfillment and pleasure?

So we have three buttons in front of us. They all work immediately. Red annihilates all existence, all life along with its potential to exist is immediately turned off. The opal button causes the gradient of dissatisfaction to be replaced immediately by a gradient of bliss, or gradually so that there is no objection to the destruction of the personality of people experiencing change. A diamond button causes the elimination of unfulfilled desires, every mind, including the minds of animals, of course, feels only enlightened peace and satisfaction, completely indifferent to the world around it. Which button should you choose, or any at all, and what should you base your choice on?

I do not consider myself a moral pluralist and from my perspective, suffering is the only value. However, this is not a complete certainty, as dissatisfaction or fulfillment set as the only value may result in a similar worldview. I don't find life worthwhile in itself, nor am I convinced that the gradient of fulfillment is metaphysically different from the gradient of dissatisfaction. For the time being, however, I don't see desires as bad in themselves. Likewise, I don't see life or existence as bad in and of itself. Suffering is bad in itself, it is a negative state, if we treat suffering as intense dissatisfaction, we can consider any state of unmet need as a negative state, even if it is not related to suffering. However, this is not a view that must be held.

If there was a button to annihilate suffering, all its forms, including those negatively perceived by the mind as non-fulfillment, so all I perceive to be worthy and all I care about, it would be more than enough.

If I had a choice of three buttons, none of which would allow any suffering and no potential for its existence, I don't see a compelling reason to prefer either of them. Perhaps, not being sure of one's value system, recognizing that perhaps happiness or fulfillment has value in itself, one should press the button that annihilates the least. Red annihilates life, desires, and suffering, diamond annihilates desires and suffering, opal only suffering, leaving fulfilling desires, happiness, and life. With good reasons to believe that happiness matters in itself, or even without good reason to doubt it, in a hypothetical situation, perhaps an opal button should be pressed. I hope that when a future existence chooses its future, it will be guided by well-thought-out motives and knowledge we don't have for now.

I would like to separate what I feel from what I think after reflection. I associate the vision of a diamond button with taking existing beings of their entire identity, destroying them, and replacing them with mechanisms that feel only blissful indifference, perhaps only indifference, a fate not much different from death. Feeling eternal bliss itself seems to be burdened with one desire, the desire to persist in this state, while the complete elimination of desires should remove the desire to persist as well. I do not find this scenario tempting, but I do not see a compelling reason why it should be an undesirable state.

Cravings can be minimized by combining visions of the world after pressing a diamond and an opal button. Eternal fulfillment, the maximum mystical union with the nature of the world and sentient existence, should be synonymous with the diverse paradise usually imagined by transhumanists. For people at the present level of development, paradise, a place where desires are fulfilled and not abandoned, seems the most tempting for now. However, seeing that it is because of our psychological mechanism, which forces us to pursue goals and strive for new achievements, I do not see this mechanism as something necessary or useful. Any progress, dreams, pure satisfaction, or ensuring existence for an eternal blissful existence is completely pointless to me in my innermost being. Yes, it is beautiful, I would like to taste such a paradise myself, but nothing has yet convinced me that metaphysically it would be a state in any way better than non-existence. The fact that there is probably no vision more beautiful for the human mind than eternal bliss, a diverse paradise devoid of boredom and suffering, shows to me how deeply ingrained in the psyche is the desire to change the present state of the cosmos.

Beauty, delight, and existential fulfillment can be created in a potentially unlimited number of ways. The paradise of alien civilizations, animals, or even transhumans would probably be completely different from our imaginations. In fact, we would probably perceive most of the havens as caricatured anomalies. None of the havens could even exist forever, as I have described before for the sake of simplicity. The number of sensations possible for the minds to feel is absolutely finite, sooner or later, after a billion, a trillion, or a quintillion years, the whole of the possible experiences in life would be realized. Then what? What, when there is nothing left to feel? Does the nonexistence, waiting for our souls, postponed by an unimaginable number of joyful cosmic eras really make existence anything better than immediate, unconscious, and painless death?

Therefore, I do not see the need to implement the vision presented by David Pearce in the hedonistic imperative. I don't see the need to create happiness and fulfillment in isolation from unfulfillment, dissatisfaction, and suffering other than by preventing and minimizing harm. Likewise, I do not see the need to minimize or give up desires as long as it does not further minimize suffering. If something is not contributing to minimizing suffering, I see absolutely no need to pursue such a goal. Apart from the assumption of moral pluralism, I know of no good reason why either option should be preferred. I think that with the assumptions adopted in this way, a completely rational approach would be absolute indifference to which button to choose.

In reality, the potential for suffering cannot be eliminated. In none of the three scenarios, if it were to be painstakingly implemented by advanced technologies, superintelligence, and the sophisticated endeavors of future civilizations, there is neither a guarantee nor the possibility of eliminating the existence of suffering from the potential of it altogether. The ideal plan for the sterilization of space, in which swarms of super-intelligent, self-replicating machines painlessly euthanize biospheres and civilizations, as well as prevent any form of life in the universe, cannot eliminate all suffering. Even moving at relativistic velocities, in the near future, due to the expansion of space, it will not be physically possible in any way to leave our local supercluster of galaxies. The absolute majority of the present observable cosmos, not to mention the potential infinity of space beyond our Hubble volume, will remain forever unattainable to us. Superintelligence that eliminates life in our scrap of available space is also not logically reliable, apart from the obvious and chilling dangers of superintelligence, which may turn out to be the most terrible invention in the history of the universe, billions of times worse than all the suffering of the entire visible cosmos that would have to be experienced without it, even benevolent superintelligence can fail and lead to cosmic suffering, perhaps in ways we cannot understand or imagine. One such concern would be the emergence of a virus infecting the minds of altruistic superintelligence through a bug in the code. However, the probability of such an event, when an effective altruistic superintelligence will already exist, especially having the best possible - designed by superintelligence - mechanisms of defense against such dangers, is negligible in practice. Whether we like it or not, superintelligence is likely to arise in any scenario for the future development of civilization. The singularity is close and possibly unstoppable. Destroying the world before the rise of superintelligence may not be such a crazy idea anyway, the profit and loss account of its creation probably ranges from minus infinity to infinity.

Even if the cosmos is effectively kept lifeless, the heat death of the universe will sooner or later eliminate all matter. However, as a result of almost infinitely small probabilities, quantum fluctuations will spontaneously create matter, including all possible finite configurations of atoms and information, along with minds feeling suffering. This exotic scenario seems inevitable because it is impossible to destroy the cosmos itself, the energy seems eternal. Assuming that the suffering of two identical minds results in twice the amount of suffering, we can do nothing about the suffering of the Boltzmann brains. I emphasize this to show that the potential for suffering can never be brought to zero.

Both the practical realizations of paradise, in the form of nirvana or as represented by David Pearce's gradient of bliss, there is as much space for superintelligence viruses. In fact, there is an enormously greater danger of implying suffering because there are trillions of entities available at any moment in the virtual worlds or the material cosmos. Even if the probability of causing enormous suffering is minimal, it is never zero and can never be zero. Is the finite, orgasmic fulfillment of trillions of beings worth the hellish suffering of just one being? Is the possibility of turning even a fraction of paradise into hell, even unimaginably small, worthy of creating paradise? Not for me. I don't see a logical way to eliminate the suffering potential. If I had to choose a scenario, I would choose one that limits this potential to the absolute minimum that is achievable. I don't know which scenario it would be. Personally, it seems to me that the existence of fewer entities and less diverse kinds of them minimizes the danger of astronomical suffering more than the creation of the most beautiful utopian paradises full of happy sentient creatures. If we can, by not creating the heavens, minimize the likelihood of the worst suffering of even one being, other things equal, I would like paradise never to come into existence, and I would let the universe become an empty and silent place.

All that I have presented in this material are my reflections, supported by a limited view of cosmology and knowledge of transhumanistic expectations. Assumptions about giving value are, as always, crucial. We can implement any of the options, humanity seems to have the potential to create technology that allows it. Personally, I am convinced that functional superintelligence will most likely be humanity's last invention, then reality becomes unpredictable. We can think with our mediocre intelligence whether to press a diamond, opal, or red button, but in reality, the future of the earth, if not destroyed sooner, will be decided by a superintelligence, in the form of artificial or neuromorphic intelligence, transhumans or posthumans. I hope they will have the same goals as those of sentient, suffering life. I believe it is up to them to make the final decision as to whether to prevent the future life, make it hell, or an ultimately pointless paradise.

On Promortalism

 

Promortalism is a philosophical view that ceasing to exist is always a positive phenomenon. It recognizes that to cease to exist is always better for the individual than existence. In fact, although philosophical promortalism always sees cessation as desirable from a selfish point of view, nowadays, promortalism also seems to describe the notion that there are situations in which it is selfishly profitable to continue to exist. The original promortalism, propagated by Jihwoon Hwang, makes it clear that ending existence is always better for the individual than continuing life, and that, assuming annihilationism, therefore assuming that death is annihilation, it is always individually more profitable to choose an earlier death.

I consider such absolute promortalism to be a logically coherent view, well-argued, and deeply rooted in pure existential pessimism. Jiwoon Hwang himself took his own life in his early twenties, as did the 19th-century philosopher Philip Mainlander (at the age of 34), and probably like dozens of others who did not consider propagating that philosophy worth their time.

Existential pessimism, in a way that seems to be rooted in our current understanding of a cosmos, claims that neither life nor conscious existence has any value in itself, the absolute of existence is a state devoid of ultimate meaning and purpose. There is a lack of fulfillment in the lives of sentient beings due to constant needs and desires, so existence is a state of constant existential dissatisfaction. All actions are motivated by needs that potentially never end, and meeting and satisfying them is necessary to get rid of negative sensations such as boredom, emptiness, despair, and suffering. All pleasant states can be brought down to reducing this existential, metaphysical dissatisfaction. Desires can be seen as undesirable in itself, as in tranquilism, or as the immediate cause of suffering, which is bad in itself. On the first assumption, promortalism becomes legitimate and rational as long as there are desires or potential for them to exist, therefore, as far as we know, in absolutely every logically possible state of being. In the second case, if transhumanism and superintelligence could eliminate suffering and replace the gradient of dissatisfaction with a gradient of bliss, promortalism need not be obligatory if we consider pleasure or fulfillment to be good in itself. Even in such a scenario, however, there is a potential for suffering, so promortalism still seems a rational choice. In practice, I do not see a way to create any positive state in itself, the phenomenon of pleasure and fulfillment, even if they were the only states that exist, does not make the gradient of dissatisfaction something else by nature. The only thing that changes is the intensity of the metaphysical dissatisfaction felt. If we could make all minds immune to suffering, knowing absolutely nothing they feel is unpleasant, it would probably be a beautiful vision, but the state of being, with the existence of desires, would still be a metaphysically negative state. In this case, however, apart from the possibility of suffering, which is extremely important in practice, I do not think that it is a problem.

So far, however, transhumanism and the gradient of bliss on the desired level is a futuristic scenario, and the gradient of unpleasant dissatisfaction is responsible for the most actions in the life of sentient beings. By accepting the metaphysical view of reality postulated by existential pessimism and recognizing subjective fulfillment and non-fulfillment as a value, and it is in practice a value for every sentient being, life should be a state that does not bring and cannot bring anything different than, in the best scenario,  minimization of the ultimate existential non-fulfillment. The state of non-existence, usually equated with death, is neither negative nor positive by itself, it is a lack of any state, an abstract concept, but associated with a real physical possibility. Death, more specifically non-existence, is not a negative phenomenon, and since there is no positive phenomenon by nature, it is the best possible "state" because of its absolute neutrality and lack of any potential. Death is also not positive in itself, it is the termination and non-existence of negativity, which makes choosing it profitable from the perspective of the individual.

Both Schopenhauer and Mainlander, who considered themselves an intellectual heir of Schopenhauer, held the view that deficiencies and non-fulfillment are what exists in a "positive" way, the nature of all feeling is only different levels of lack and non-fulfillment, resulting from the existence of unsatisfied and potentially impossible to satisfy cravings. The state of unsatisfied desires is an unfavorable condition. Jiwoon Hwang used Benatar's asymmetry argument in his defense of promortalism, which fit perfectly into that inspired by eastern religions' reasoning. The lack of pleasure is not bad in itself, it is never bad to deprive of pleasure or satisfaction a nonexistent being. On the other hand, the state of non-suffering is good even when there is no one to experience this suffering. In some sense, it is good strictly because of that. The argument from asymmetry is, in this sense and to some extent, a recognition of the metaphysical negativity of the essence of needs, and therefore an expression of metaphysical pessimism. And it certainly does not contradict it in any aspect. Benatar himself denies that it would lead to promortalism. This is due, in whole or in part, to the assumption that death is always a harm, and that longer life can be desirable.

Even if we consider death to be bad, which is not determined to be in full accord with the rest of Benatar's philosophy, and is certainly not obvious, death is also a necessity, it cannot be stopped, it can only be postponed. In case if it is a harm, a longer life adds only more harm to the one necessary.

This potential inaccuracy was noticed and described by Rafe McGregor and Ema Sullivan-Bissett in the article "Better No Longer to Be", in a transparent manner, pointing out the most important inaccuracies. To quote ...

"If one accepts Benatar’s asymmetry between pleasure and pain, then prima facie one ought to accept that suicide is always preferable to continued existence. The reason for this is straightforward: if Benatar is right that it is better never to have existed, then non-existence must still be preferable to existing even when the agent in question has been unfortunate enough to be brought into existence. When the agent ceases to exist the result is an absence of pain, which is good, and an absence of pleasure, which is not bad. This is the basic case for the claim that Benatar’s anti-natalism entails pro-mortalism" end of quote

Authors, neither of whom agree with the assumptions leading to promortalism, argue that the version of anti-natalism that results from accepting asymmetry, without making any additional assumptions, clearly implies promortalism. I don't see the need to make additional assumptions and that's why I believe it indeed the case.

In his description of promortalism, Johwoon Hwang, in fact, familiar with the mentioned article, presents an identical view. Quotes...

"David Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry of harms and benefits, when combined with (exclusively) hedonistic view of harms and benefits, entails pro-mortalism. Professor Benatar’s view that the absence of pleasure of who never exists does not deprive, while the absence of pleasure of who ceased to exist does deprive, has some absurd conclusions that judges which life is a preferable one differently in ‘present-‘ and ‘future-life cases’.[...]Benatar’s asymmetry should be applied to post-mortem nonexistence as well, [...]so long as one’s remaining life will contain any pain, it is always preferable to cease to exist than to continue to exist." 

"Rather than thinking the pro-mortalist implications as a reductio, believe in a soundness of pro-mortalism"

For those unfamiliar with Jiwoon Hwang's argumentation, a link to his essay is provided below.

http://jiwoonhwang.org/pro-mortalism/

Thus, in its pure form, promortalism states that existence is always a negative state and, hence, ceasing to exist is always in the interest of every individual. The sooner the less bad.

In theory, the statement that life is ultimately a negative state should include the notion that there are or may be metaphysically positive elements in life, but the danger of suffering is too high, especially including the risk of astronomical suffering, which makes life ultimately always unprofitable.

The future existence itself can be seen as creating new entities, specifically future versions of our present person, as argued by Jiwoon. It can be considered that the state of further life is comparable to the creation of new beings, assuming empty individualism it could be even identical with that. In both cases, new experiences are created, new observer moments, exposed to suffering and guided by a pointless gradient of dissatisfaction. As Jiwoon Hwang describes it:

"One can think each moment one wakes up from sleep or every second of her life as an axiological equivalent of cases of coming into existence. Why should we treat the cases in which a person wakes up from unconsciousness differently from coming into existence? Moreover, in the intervening period of unconsciousness even needed? If not, we can construe each second of a person’s life as a new life, as a coming into existence. This might not be a very absurd view if we were to deny that one exists as a distinct metaphysical self (personal identity) that does not change over time. One can prevent one’s future self from coming into existence by death."

In practice, paradoxically, promortalism is not the view that it is always a rational decision to kill yourself. The premise of moral solipsism does not seem very widespread, and certainly, if the value is to minimize harm, from a global perspective, the death of some individuals may not ultimately be profitable, even though most beings most certainly do more harm than they prevent. However, I would like to leave the question of practical moral solipsism and its relation to rationality unresolved for the time being.

Non-existence is always better for the one who ceased to exist. This does not mean, however, that the dying process is good. Contrary. While the fear of death may automatically be regarded as irrational, the fear of dying is entirely justified, as the very process of dying is perhaps one of the most unpleasant events for most beings who die consciously.

The altruistic reason for continuing existence is the desire to minimize the suffering in the world. Getting rid of and weakening some of the illusions that lead to an irrational evaluation of the world is very often a long and painful process. The feeling of moral responsibility for the way the world works, or a very strong desire to stop harm, is a very good rational reason for continuing a negative existence if it can be morally profitable. It is certainly a noble choice, and often more difficult than choosing not to exist.

I am not arguing that the altruistic reason is the most common or the most important motive for the continuation of existence by promortalists, both those declared and those presenting a promortalist worldview unaware of the rather sparsely used term. The irrational, natural, inborn, and perpetuated by society's will to live is, in my opinion, without a doubt the main reason for continuing to exist. The deep-seated optimism bias and "existence bias" seem to be completely inseparable from the views held by most of humanity regarding existence as something positive and worth living. Seeing life as worth continuing and enduring suffering, even though it is ultimately finite and pointless, is a simple and brilliant evolutionary mechanism for ensuring survival. But survival is not and has never been, the most important goal of sentient minds. Survival is the goal of the program that controls living organisms, the only, unconscious, function of the program, in the case of biological terrestrial life, it is DNA, is to prolong its own existence. A mind is merely a tool, programmed by genetics and psychology to facilitate the survival of the program. Although the mind's instrumental goal is also to prolong being, the primary goal is to be less dissatisfied less deprived, to fulfill emerging needs and desires, which temporarily reduces the gradient of dissatisfaction. It is not in the interest of the sentient mind in such an assumption to continue to exist, but only to eliminate the gradient of unfulfilled needs, thus reducing unmet needs to zero. In fact, the desire to live is inscribed in the human psyche, where intelligence and rationality are also only a tool for the realization of desires to reduce unfulfillment.

Regardless of the rationality of the motive, the lack of a strong, irresistible desire to die as soon as possible does not in any way interfere with the recognition of the rationality of promortalism. The human mind is not, was not intended to be, and never was fully rational, and since it has evolved as a means of facilitating survival, its effective creations must be compatible with this purpose to propagate. If full rationality does not ensure the program's survival, it is automatically disqualified as a mechanism useless for the program. Bounded rationality, with an overwhelming number of cognitive biases and defense mechanisms, is much more effective machinery. Knowledge of such a state of affairs is usually unable to create a need or a desire for death to a degree that would allow it to be realized. Emotional dependencies and addictions are what direct the mind to the greatest extent, usually making it difficult, and often impossible, to make wholly rational decisions. Phenomena with enormous emotional baggage, like death,  are usually those that are most difficult to approach in a rational manner, and the mere questioning of some unwritten views may expose you to social exclusion or cause remorse.

The decision to end own existence is also psychologically extremely difficult. Even though the amount of suffering prevented is usually less than that caused, the perception of suffering directly related to our death, felt by loved ones, is for some reason a sufficient argument to continue even a hopeless existence. Relative pleasure in life is another such reason, even in the case of promortalists it causes "procrastination of death". The lack of safe, non-severe, and non-threatening means available is another important aspect. The right to die, the right to cease existence is not widely recognized. Only a handful of countries and states make it possible to commit assisted suicide, and only in the most severe cases. There are no universal, professional ways to die a graceful death, but there is tragedy, brutality, and the danger of becoming disabled. The fact that this is a taboo subject discourages large-scale discussion of such issues.

I am the only promortalist known to me who sees another reason as relevant, and so far it seems to me unexistent in the wider debate. In practice, promortalism seems to presuppose an annihilationist interpretation of death, as it seems to be supported by physicalism. Death is understood as the annihilation of the mind, eternal and irreversible, the result of which is the state of non-existence, or rather the absence of any state. An alternative interpretation is not widely known and is rarely presented outside of religious dogma. While dismissing religious bias as absurd, at least two other interpretations seem compatible with physicalism. The simulation hypothesis may make the understanding of death as an exit from the simulation worth considering. However, the gradient of desires still seems to be indispensable, regardless of whether we do exist in a virtual or non-virtual world. Another death, absolute death, can occur after exiting the simulation, so abandoning the state of existence is still possible. The second, no less compatible with physicalism, but the more exotic scenario is the concept of multiverse immortality, both in the form of quantum immortality and big world immortality. After adopting a few assumptions, such as modal realism and copy-friendly theory of identity, the annihilation of subjectively continued experience becomes absolutely impossible. In such a scenario, the technological reduction of desires to a minimum in virtual worlds may be the only long-term solution. Achieving The Ultimate Indifference via future technology in the case of multiverse immortality is a topic for more attention. Promortalism, therefore, the recognition of non-existence as preferred over any state of existence is still a rational view, even if non-existence is not possible. This approach will not be discussed in greater detail here.

This material represents, in a highly non-exhaustive manner, my approach and understanding of the philosophy of promortalism. It seems to be the logical conclusion of the general message of certain currents of philosophical pessimism that life is ultimately a negative phenomenon. Promortalism claims that based on such facts it is always good for an individual to cease to exist. Always, Other things equal, the sooner the better. Promortalism does not mean a wish to die, and in the light of the objective irrationality of the human mind, it is hard for a rational person to consider a promortalist to be a hypocrite for not killing themself. Just as a heroinist wishing to quit drug addiction is not accused of hypocrisy when he fails to cut himself off the drug, the same way a living promortalist is not an intellectual paradox even if he's a moral solipsist. In the rejection of moral solipsism, any action that ultimately reduces the amount of lack and suffering is worthwhile, including continuing to exist for this purpose. For this reason, I completely advise against all promortalists who are not moral solipsists, and therefore deem the suffering of others to be truly morally significant, to end their existence if your existence is, or can be, morally profitable. Your life can be a decisive factor in the future of many.

Lifeism

 

The term lifeism appeared as part of the critique of efilism. Lifeism is the opposite of efilism and seems to stem from a rejection of philosophical pessimism. Efilism regards life as a negative phenomenon and deems its extinction desirable. Lifeism views existence as something worth continuing and is opposed to actions intended to accomplish the erasure of life.

Outlining a clear dichotomy between these two currents of worldviews by presenting them as mutually exclusive terms may provoke the undecided to take their position and consider their vision of the world, perhaps redefining some of its elements. When accepting any of the views, one has to take into account the logical consequences of adopting them. Both lifeism and efilism have controversial and often very uncomfortable elements for the human psyche, and the choice between approving of extinction, accepting the lack of future suffering and satisfaction, and approval of continuing or spreading life, accepting a huge amount of suffering and satisfaction, is not obvious if we try to consider both options from the position of suspension of judgment.

Lifeism is, in contrast to efilism, the claim that conscious and sentient life is worth spreading or continuing. Life has a value in itself, or some values make the creation of a conscious life legitimate or morally good. The declared goal of lifeism is not that ultimately life to be erased, but its duration and continuation as long as possible. Lifeism, then, is not the notion that we should not be dying out now if we want to prevent as much harm as possible, by keeping civilization alive for the ultimate sterilization of space. Passive lifeism seems to be a default view that exists in the background of models-of the-world. Perhaps for this reason it was not widely recognized as a certain philosophical position, being an automatic axiom. Active lifeism should involve focusing on the propagation of life itself (biological, sentient, or conscious) and spreading it across the planet and, potentially, throughout the available (material or virtual) cosmos.

Lifeism, therefore, argues that life must be maintained or proliferated. The extinction of life is seen as a negative phenomenon. In theory, even if it was not at the cost of any suffering.

Lifeism in practice should imply the recognition of nature as valuable, as well as taking steps to preserve it, protect it from destruction, and reconstruct environments, although a hypothetical futuristic lifeist could object to the protection of our nature if using its resources could result in the creation of more life, like the colonization of other planets or virtual worlds. The idea of filling the future cosmos or virtual worlds with life is inherently extremely lifeistic.

Certainly, in abstract scenarios, we can imagine actions that do not fit the definitions of lifeism nor efilism. For example, post-biological intelligence (posthumanism, extreme transhumanism) whose representatives are immortal but do not create new life, or (in some exotic case) a collective mind engulfing other minds to make them a part of some cosmic unity.

Sometimes it can be useful to distinguish between weak lifeism, considering life something that we should not or must not destroy, but it is not advisable or necessary to spread it and propagate it in space or virtual worlds. A strong lifeism would argue that we should fill the universe with life, and the idea of doing so is beautiful and valuable. The desire to fill the cosmos with intelligent life, presented by some transhumanists, probably qualifies as a strong lifeism.

Though probably relatively widespread for its level of extremes, a similar view would be extreme lifeism, that we have a moral obligation to spread life. Bringing the cosmos or virtual worlds to life and filling them with myriads of living beings, or the moral obligation to create more transhumans or other ascended beings should be one of the moral priorities of advanced civilizations. Thus, not only would it be a moral goal to preserve existing life, such as preventing climate catastrophes on, say, planets with alien life, but also to create new such planets would be a moral goal.

In terms of approaching biological life in the form that exists currently on Earth, lifeism can take two basic forms. Earthly nature can be seen as something positive in itself. Despite its cruelty and the amount of suffering, despite the existence of overwhelmingly more pain, lack, and torture than there is satisfaction, gratification, pleasure and bliss in nature, it is worth continuing and spreading through its beauty, utility, potential, or intrinsic value. Although 10 kittens for one adult ocelot have to be butchered, and many thousands of other animals must suffer agony before their death to keep one alive, the existence of the biosphere is worth continuing. Despite the original pointlessness and great pain, there is a good reason why we must not lead to the extinction of the biosphere. Therefore, nature is seen here as a value, despite or even because of the suffering that occurs in it.

The second approach would, I believe, be the look of some transhumanists. Life has some value in itself or enables the existence of other values. Creating happiness and beauty, mystical experiences, or consciously experiencing the universe or love might be some of them. Hedonism, philosophical as well as practical, and positive utilitarianism seem to operate from the perspective of this assumption, and both negative utilitarianism, tranquilism, and suffering-focused ethics are technically compatible with this claim. This does not mean accepting suffering in nature as good, useful, or necessary, but it does not mean accepting the metaphysical pessimism of life as real. The suffering of humans and animals today is a price, dreadful but necessary to pay for the happy lives of transhumans and posthumans, as well as perhaps billions of other fulfilled lives in the cosmos to come. Accepting the tragedy now justifies the well-being of future lives. To deprive the future of such enormous potential to exist and experience the beauty, love, delight, and admiration of the universe's greatness would be to impoverish the cosmos. And having in our power to enrich the universe beyond imagination, certain sufferings are worth the achievement.

Even recognizing metaphysical pessimism as true does not have to lead to efilistic views, if the value system we choose does not recognize suffering as the only value (negative value, "positive" value would be preventing it). On the other hand, it is difficult for me to imagine an internally coherent system based on metaphysical pessimism, but at the same time recognizing life as ultimately, metaphysically worth living. As I perceive both terms, they seem to be mutually exclusive if the system is to be consistent, but the variations in defining the terms used probably allow for greater flexibility in practice. However, I believe that both existential nihilism and absurdism allow one to be a lifeist and reject efilism, but that no coherent, objective system of values ​​can be involved in it. Perhaps the will to live alone would be a motive (but not an argument) to justify such a view, even admitting the irrationality or potential irrationality of such a decision. The mere irrationality of the human psyche, or more complex psychological phenomena and philosophical concepts that I have not considered because of lack of knowledge or sufficiently deep analysis of the subject, may lead to more sophisticated explanations.

This material is not meant to provoke. I believe that to emphasize the dichotomy and to highlight the fact that in terms of a philosophical approach to existence there is no "normal" position and a handful of efilists. The subject of a philosophical approach to existence is in practice complicated and the fact that the implicit view, with more and more often controversial obviousness, remains unnamed may hinder a constructive approach. Lifeism and Efilism are therefore opposite philosophical and ethical views, resulting from a different approach to the subject of the metaphysical value of life and its possible ethical implications. Efilism claims that sentient life is something that we should hold back and eventually erase. The ultimate euthanasia or extinction of all life and the prevention of its future arising is posed as the moral goal of efilism. Lifeism says we must not do that: for several possible reasons, and usually because of the implicit or deliberate assumption that life itself is worth living. The ethical goal of lifeism is to enable life to continue on earth, and potentially to create new life, including spreading it throughout the universe.

What is Efilism?

Efilism is a philosophical and ethical view that emphasizes and focuses on the metaphysical negativity of life as the ultimate cause of suffering. Manifestations of efilism or utterly efilistic approaches have previously been presented by many philosophers of existential pessimism, such as Peter Wessel Zapffe, Philip Mainlander, Emil Cioran, and partly in works of Arthur Schopenhauer. Nowadays popularised among others by internet philosophers of the Inmendham channel on YouTube. Philosophical pessimism states, that existence has no absolute value or purpose. Life is a state of constant dissatisfaction, and the goals in it are to satisfy the constantly emerging needs. The most vivid and ethically significant effect of this state of affairs is the existence of suffering experienced by living beings in billions of different ways. Indeed, all the goodness of life can be reduced to the absence of suffering and the pressure of unfulfilled desires, concluding that there is nothing metaphysically good in life itself. All pleasure and fulfillment come down to a momentary lack of harm or a reduction in suffering already felt.

In recent times, efilism is often derived from promortalism and anti-natalism with which it has much in common. In practice, efilism appears to be an extension of anti-natalist views, with an emphasis on the ultimate erasure of all life as the sole goal. Probably the most recognizable propagator of anti-natalism, David Benatar, in one of the interviews, when asked about efilism, replied that he did not even see the need to distinguish such a term because his view of anti-natalism is identical with efilism - life extinctionist view. Indeed, the approach of a large number of anti-natalists is efilistic.

In addition to the philosophical dimension that life is a metaphysically negative state that does not allow for the ultimate and complete satisfaction of needs and implies the existence of desires and suffering, the ethical dimension of efilism focuses on the theoretical and practical possibilities of eliminating the existence of suffering and needs by eliminating all life along with the potential of it. The ethical goal of efilists should be the extinction of life by the cessation of reproduction (voluntary or by making it impossible), or the physical termination of life on earth globally, the same is true for humans, animals, biological life in space, as well as all potentially nonbiological sentient beings.

It is not even a new idea, as it was postulated by, for example, Saint Augustine (who saw it as a way to end human torment by reaching God's kingdom) or a Berlin philosopher Eduard von Hartmann, who was writing about cosmic euthanasia and the destruction of the universe to prevent the misery of life. In practice, the stated purpose of efilism is not only to bring about the extinction of all sentient life, but also to take steps to prevent its re-emergence on earth or other parts of the universe. The continuous or permanent sterilization of the cosmos is seen as a victory over useless suffering and the life that makes it possible.

Indeed, efilism underlines the objective observation that all living beings, including sentient beings, are the byproduct of pointless reactions. chemical and biological evolution. A few billion years ago, life appeared on earth, 500 million years ago, the development of the nervous system made it possible to feel pain. a powerful tool fueling naturally aimless survival. An increasingly diverse biosphere had developed from the beginning of the Phanerozoic, and without civilization, it would have naturally existed for about half a billion years before the planet's surface became too hot and dry with the sun reaching its red giant phase. During this period, sentient beings acquire new needs and desires, the result and purpose of which is to escape from the sufferings associated with not being satisfied, continuing the vicious cycle of survival and reproduction, paid for by misery and torment. All that to eventually die, usually a painful death by predators or sickness.

On billions of earth-like planets in our galaxy alone, life can continue to arise and develop. Contrary to the first impression, it is not a beautiful orangery of the exotic possibilities of the universe, designed to arouse admiration and delight. Nature, either of earth or of all its countless versions realized in the depths of space, mechanically and brutally creates a display of the most elaborate hells that only the abyss of the sadistic imagination of an intelligent mind can surpass in cruelty. The only thing that can stop this abominable absurdity from developing is, somewhat tragically, an intelligent mind as well.

The minds of animals with advanced nervous systems are programmed to experience suffering and scarcity more intensely and more often than pleasure and gratification. And the gratifications attainable are always by nature short-lasting and impermanent. Natural selection mechanisms ensure that the needs are met at the minimum level.  sufficient to deliver the next generation of the species into the world. This is usually possible for a small percentage of individuals, the rest of which die, most often in a brutal and painful way, before being able to reproduce. The part of the species that can pass on the genes has the dubious privilege of experiencing further stress and suffering during the aging and death process, usually caused by being eaten alive, torn apart, or diseased. Hunger, thirst, constant exposure to threats, parasites, and unfavorable climatic conditions only add to the practical range of possible torments.

Human life is inherently no different from that of other animals, we are driven by similar, just more sophisticated, motives and needs. The metaphysical negativity and redundancy of life cannot be eliminated even by transhumanistic visions of paradises and technological miracles in the prosperity of future civilizations. On the contrary, the creation of successive lives creates an immeasurable potential for the existence of further tortures and atrocities which, even if existing among those who are satisfied with their lives, should and have to be eliminated. The ultimate futility of the endless pursuit of needs is a pillar of efilism, as are the more general currents of existential pessimism. The ethical consequences of this state of affairs imply that extinction is the only process by which sentient beings can ultimately avoid the possibility of suffering in their eventually tragically useless existence.  

Efilism seems to encompass a spectrum of ideas for the practical realization of extinction on a global scale, which include such concepts as the systematic, multi-generational emptying of the world by stopping reproduction or the destruction of life by means of violence. It should be noted that the goal is never mindless destruction or causing harm. Efilism seems to be a view rooted in negative utilitarianism, thus an ethical trend that puts the minimization of suffering as the only or the main priority. In fact, efilism is, in a sense, its final conclusion. The goal of any action leading to the extinction of societies, species, and biospheres, as well as the possible sterilization of the cosmos, is always to minimize suffering, to stop the senseless and nightmarish emergence and spread of suffering, imposed by the existence of sentient minds. In practice, as always in negative utilitarianism, the reduction of suffering is, therefore, the highest priority.

The practical execution of such an operation arouses great controversy, as humanity at the present level of development seems incapable of ending all life bent under the burden of suffering. One can speculate, although at the current level of development these are very well or potentially very well established speculations, that technologies such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, biotechnology and finally superintelligence - in the form of artificial intelligence or neuromorphic, as a result of transhumanism- will participate in the sterilization of life on earth . From a utilitarian point of view, all (all not necessary to further reduction of suffering) life on earth should be somehow exterminated, and an attainable goal may also be to destroy the potential for life as well as to prevent the emergence and development of sentient life on other planets. For the latter purpose, swarms of super-intelligent machines euthanizing life and making the cosmos uninhabitable should suffice.

The tragedy of life manifests itself not only in everyday pains, diseases, old age, or injustice. Despite life's obvious suboptimality, societies have not yet recorded such a high level of prosperity. Yet still, exploitation, persecution, and torture, even despite being widely recognized as evil, are common in most parts of the world. For tens of thousands of years, people have suffered, and even one of the documented examples, such as the suffering of Hisashi Ouchi, Junko Furuta or Sylvia Likens brings to mind the city of Omelas. Human suffering is only a fraction of the suffering of farm animals subjected to barbaric treatment and imprisoned in - literally, torture and extermination camps.

Even this amount of suffering probably disappears compared to the suffering inflicted and experienced by nature itself. Nature's anthropomorphization should be none other than a degenerate evil demiurge forcing chemical machines to copy themselves under evolutionary pressure until they die. Survival of one is paid for by the death of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of other sentient creatures, rarely not in torment. All that hellish race of living beings serve only one purpose: their minds, devoid of evolutionarily useless full rationality, are to desire to duplicate the genetic code of the organism, and the whole cycle should be repeated indefinitely.

In fact, even without human intervention, the advanced global biosphere, covered with metaphorical forests of mold and swarms of multicellular vermin, is already halfway through its existence. In less than a billion years. eyeblink in a cosmic timescale. the earth would be a barren wasteland scorched by the sun swelling in its deathly contractions. By this time, the amount of suffering would have multiplied, leaving behind most of the pain of  life that exists to this day, of which approximately 100% is already dead. While the amount of suffering and failure will multiply, the amount of complete fulfillment will remain the same. it will NOT exist. Indeed, it is doubtful that any escape from desires is even logically possible without giving up existence, although minimizing desires in the form of pointless technological nirvana may theoretically be feasible.

It should be noted here that I do not see a logical reason for preventing an efilist from rejecting pure metaphysical pessimism, from recognizing that certain elements of life have a positive value and that happiness, for example, understood differently from the state of non-suffering and non-fulfillment, has a value in itself. I do not consider such a view to be logical, but in my opinion, it is compatible with the desire to end all life.

Not only the obvious metaphysical negativity of existence driven by a gradient of dissatisfaction may be the determining factor in accepting efilism. The very awareness of how tragic and almost infinitely sadistic the future of life can turn out to be, in which there is a logical and, seemingly, the physical possibility of the emergence of superintelligence and simulations. in which sentient beings will experience unimaginable and impossible to end tortures. simulations of the worst hells and the cruelest  torment of a quadrillion times carried out on the quintillions of beings is not an unreal abstraction. On the contrary, they can be so real that even a speck of their reality would disturb the psychological health of anyone who could imagine them with sufficient vividness for even a fraction of a second.

Imagine a closed room in which your body has an artificially heightened sense of pain, and in which a sadistic being slowly, allowing you to stay aware in overwhelming terror, burns you and tears you apart, tears off scraps of burned skin piece by piece, pierces your eyes and slides acid-covered blades into Your flesh through all of your body openings. In speaking of unimaginable suffering, I do not mean distant screams of condemned, but bodies plunged in bursting despair, which cannot die and cannot escape for eternity. Even the very existence of the risk that something like this will happen to just one being, and even at the cost of eternal fulfillment and paradise for the rest of the cosmos, if the alternative is non-existence, is unthinkable for me to take.

No matter how far we delve into apparent abstractions in our predictions, and how we evaluate superintelligence, future sociology, or transhumanism, efilism will no doubt only become more common if, I believe, it is a rational view firmly grounded in reality and to prevent harm is a universal value. Efilism, whose etymology is the word "life" read backward, is another link in the chain of reason, which painstakingly recognizes life as something unequivocally tragic and negative. Life is not even making it metaphysically possible to experience some complete and stable, eternal fulfillment, all satisfaction has its source in reduced or prevented suffering and dissatisfaction. Thomas Ligotti in his "Conspiracy Against the Human Race" describes life as "malignantly useless", which I think conveys the nature of that horror of existence in a devastatingly meaningful way.

Efilism, therefore, claims that lack of suffering, along with phenomena that leads to suffering has a value. Any sentient life, biological, virtual or technological, with all its baggage of dissatisfaction, realized and potential pain, despair and suffering is not worth enduring and continuing, and that ultimately the most cost-effective solution is to eliminate it for eternity,  or as long as possible, from the Universe.

{Polish version}

Efilizm to nurt filozoficzno-etyczny skupiający się na metafizycznej negatywności życia. Uznaje on życie za ostatecznie pozbawione sensu i celu, a świadome istnienie za przyczynę wszelkiego zła. Wymazanie życia z kosmosu jest w nim postrzegane jako środek mający wyeliminować cierpienie.  Przejawy efilizmu lub całkowicie efilistyczne podejścia przedstawiane były przez wielu filozofów prezentujących poglądy z zakresu filozoficznego pesymizmu, takich jak Peter Wessel Zapffe, Philip Mainlander, Emil Cioran czy Arthur Schopenhauer. W obecnych czasach efilizm rozpowszechniany jest między innymi przez internetowego filozofa kanału Inmendham. Filozoficzny pesymizm głosi, że istnienie nie posiada żadnej absolutnej wartości ani żadnego niezależnego od umysłów, uniwersalnego celu. Życie jest stanem koniecznego niezaspokojenia, a celami w nim jest uzupełnianie pojawiających się ciągle potrzeb. Najjaskrawszym, i najistotniejszym z perspektywy etyki skutkiem takiego stanu rzeczy jest istnienie cierpień, doświadczanych przez żyjące istoty na miliardy najróżniejszych sposobów. Całe dobro życia można w istocie sprowadzić do braku cierpień, niewygód i niezaspokojonych potrzeb, dochodząc do konkluzji, że w samym życiu nie istnieje nic metafizycznie pozytywnego. Cała przyjemność i spełnienie są sprowadzalne do chwilowego braku krzywdy lub zmniejszenia już odczuwanego dyskomfortu. 

Efilizm jest często wyprowadzany z antynatalizmu, z którym ma wiele wspólnego. W praktyce efilizm wydaje się być rozszerzeniem antynatalistycznych poglądów, ze szczególnym naciskiem na ostateczne wymazanie całego życia będące moralnym celem. Chyba najbardziej rozpoznawalny propagator antynatalizmu, David Benatar, w jednej z rozmów, zapytany o efilizm, odparł, że nie widzi nawet potrzeby wyróżniania takiego terminu, ponieważ jego pogląd na antynatalizm jest tożsamy z efilizmem - ekstynkcjonizmem życia. Podejście znacznej części antynatalistów jest w istocie efilistyczne. 

Oprócz filozoficznego wymiaru, twierdzącego że życie jest metafizycznie stanem negatywnym, niepozwalającym na ostateczne zaspokojenie potrzeb i implikujące istnienie pragnień i cierpienia, etyczny wymiar efilizmu skupia się zatem na teoretycznych i praktycznych możliwościach eliminacji samego istnienia. Etycznym celem według efilistów powinno być wyginięcie życia przez zaprzestanie lub uniemożliwienie reprodukcji lub fizyczne globalne go zakończenie, wyginięcie ludzi, zwierząt, biologicznego życia  w kosmosie, jak również wszystkich potencjalnie niebiologicznych czujących istot. 

Pogląd ten był prezentowany przez berlińskiego filozofa, jakim był Eduard von Hartmann, piszącego o kosmicznej eutanazji i zniszczeniu wszechświata dla uniemożliwienia niedoli życia. 

W praktyce deklarowanym celem efilizmu jest nie tylko doprowadzenie do wygaśnięcia wszelkiego czującego życia, ale również podjęcie kroków mających zapobiec jego ponownemu powstaniu na ziemi i w  innych częściach wszechświata. Ciągła lub permanentna sterylizacja kosmosu jest postrzegana jako zwycięstwo nad bezużytecznym cierpieniem i życiem, które czyni je możliwym. 

W istocie efilizm podkreśla obiektywną obserwację, że wszystkie żywe, w tym czujące istoty są  produktem ubocznym bezcelowych samych w sobie reakcji chemicznej i biologicznej ewolucji. Około miliarda late temu na ziemi pojawiło się życie, 500 milinów lat później rozwój układu nerwowego umożliwił odczuwanie bólu- potężnego narzędzia napędzającego bezcelowe z natury przetrwanie. Coraz bardziej różnorodna biosfera rozwija się od początku fanerozoiku i bez cywilizacji istniałaby jeszcze około pół miliarda lat, zanim powierzchnia planety nie stanie się zbyt gorąca i sucha przez osiągające fazę czerwonego olbrzyma słońce. W ciągu tego okresu czujące istoty nabywają kolejnych potrzeb i pragnień, których wynikiem i celem jest ucieczka od cierpień związanych z niezaspokojeniem ich, kontynuując błędny cykl okupionego nieszczęściami przetrwania i reprodukcji. 

Na miliardach ziemiopodobnych planet samej tylko naszej galaktyki życie może dalej powstawać i rozwijać się. Wbrew pierwotnemu wrażeniu, nie jest to piękna oranżeria egzotycznych możliwości wszechświata, stworzona by wzbudzać podziw i zachwyt. Natura, tak ziemska, jak i wszystkie niezliczone jej wersje urzeczywistniane w otchłaniach kosmosu, mechanicznie i brutalnie tworzy pokaz najwymyślniejszych piekieł, które tylko otchłanie sadystycznej wyobraźni inteligentnego umysłu mogą przewyższyć w okrucieństwie. Jedynym zjawiskiem, które może powstrzymać rozwój tego abominacyjnego absurdu, jest, nieco tragicznie, również inteligentny umysł. 

Umysły zwierząt z zaawansowanym układem nerwowym zaprogramowane są do odczuwania bólu i braków intensywniej i częściej niż przyjemności i zaspokojenia. Osiągalne zaspokojenia są zaś ze swej natury nietrwałe. Mechanizmy doboru naturalnego zapewniają spełnienie potrzeb na minimalnym poziomie, wystarczającym do wydania na świat kolejnego pokolenia gatunku. Możliwe jest to zazwyczaj dla marnego procenta osobników, z których reszta ginie, najczęściej w brutalny i bolesny sposób, zanim osiągnie możliwość reprodukcji. Ta część gatunku, która daje radę przekazać geny, ma wątpliwy przywilej doświadczania kolejnych stresów i cierpień podczas procesu starzenia się i śmierci spowodowanej zazwyczaj przez zjedzenie żywcem, rozszarpanie lub choroby. Głód, pragnienie, ciągłe wystawienie na obecność zagrożeń, pasożytów i niesprzyjające warunki klimatyczne tylko dokładają się do uwidocznienia praktycznego wachlarza możliwych męczarni. 

Ludzkie życie z natury nie różni się od życia innych zwierząt, kierują nami podobne, choć bardziej wyrafinowane, motywy i potrzeby. Metafizycznej negatywności i niepotrzebności życia nie mogą wyeliminować nawet transhumanistyczne wizje rajów i technologicznych cudów pogrążonych w dobrobycie przyszłych cywilizacji. Przeciwnie, tworzenie kolejnych istnień powoduje powstanie niezmierzonego potencjału do powstawania kolejnych tortur i okrucieństw na skalę nigdy jeszcze nieznaną istnieniu, co powinno być wyeliminowane. Ostateczna bezcelowość niekończącej się gonitwy za potrzebami jest filarem efilizmu, podobnie jak i bardziej ogólnych poglądów głoszących egzystencjalny pesymizm. Jako moralne rozwiązanie tego prblemu stawiany jest ekstynkcjonizm. 

Efilizm  zdaje się obejmować spektrum idei na praktyczne urzeczywistnienie wymarcia na globalną skalę, które obejmują takie koncepcje jak systematyczne, wielopokoleniowe opustoszenie świata przez zaprzestanie rozmnażania lub zniszczenie życia za pomocą przemocy. Należy zaznaczyć, że celem nigdy nie jest tu bezmyślna destrukcja czy powodowanie krzywdy. Efilizm jest poglądem zakorzenionym w ramach negatywnego utylitaryzmu, zatem nurtu etycznego stawiającego minimalizację cierpienia za jedyny lub główny priorytet i jest w istocie jego zwieńczeniem. Celem jakichkolwiek działań mających doprowadzić do wymarcia społeczeństw, gatunków i biosfer, a także możliwej sterylizacji kosmosu jest zawsze minimalizacja cierpienia, powstrzymanie bezsensownego i koszmarnego powstawania i rozprzestrzeniania się cierpiącego życia. W praktyce, jak zawsze w negatywnym utylitaryzmie, redukcja cierpienia jest zatem najwyższym priorytetem.

Nie istneją na razie nadzieje na praktyczne wykonanie takiej operacji, jako że ludzkość na obecnym poziomie rozwoju wydaje się niezdolna do obarczonego jak najmniejszym ładunkiem cierpienia zakończenia całego życia. Można spekulować, choć na obecnym poziomie rozwoju są to bardzo dobrze lub potencjalnie bardzo dobrze ugruntowane przypuszczenia, że w sterylizacji życia na ziemi brałyby udział takie technologie jak inżynieria genetyczna, nanotechnologia, biotechnologia czy wreszcie superinteligencja - w formie sztucznej inteligencji lub neuromorficznej, powstałej jako wynik transhumanizmu. Z utylitarystycznego punktu widzenia wszelkie, (wszelkie niekonieczne do dalszej minimalizacji cierpienia) życie ma ziemi powinno być bezboleśnie eksterminowane, a osiągalnym celem może również być zniszczenie potencjału do powstania życia, jak również powstania i rozwoju czujących istot  na innych planetach. Do tego ostatniego celu mogłyby być wykorzystane roje superinteligentnych maszyn. 

Tragizm życia objawia się nie tylko w codziennych bólach, chorobach, starości czy niesprawiedliwości. Mimo swojej oczywistej nieoptymalności społeczeństwa nie notowały jeszcze tak wysokiego poziomu dobrobytu. Nadal jednak wykorzystywania, prześladowania i tortury są, mimo bycia tematem tabu, względnie powszechnym zjawiskiem w większości rejonów świata. Przez dziesiątki tysięcy lat ludzie doznawali cierpień, z których nawet jeden z udokumentowanych przykładów, jak cierpienie Hisashi Ouchi, utrzymywanego przy życiu przez 83 dni mimo odpadającej z powodu śmiertelnego napromieniowania skóry,  Junko Furuty czy  Sylvi Likens przywołują na myśl miasto Omelas. Cierpienie człowieka stanowi jedynie ułamek cierpienia zwierząt hodowlnaych, poddawanych barbarzyńskimu traktowaniu, uwięzionych i produkowanychw masowych ilościach  w - dosłownie, obozach tortur i zagłady . 

Nawet ta ilość cierpienia prawdopodobnie niknie w porównianu z cierpieniem zadawanym i doświadczanym przez samą naturę. Antropomorfizacja natury powinna być nikim innym jak zwyrodniałym demiurgiem zmuszającym chemiczne maszynki do kopiowania się pod ewolucyjnym ciśnieniem dopóki nie wymrą. Przeżycie okupione jest śmiercią, rzadko nie w męczarniach, niemal każdego młodego, żyjące zaś byty służą tylko jednemu celowi: ich pozbawione nieprzydatnej ewolucyjnie pełnej racjonalności umysły mają pragnąć tak, aby powielić kod genetyczny organizmu. Nieuświadomionym  i niewykonalnym celem jest  aby cały cykl powtarzał się w nieskończoność.

W rzeczywistości, nawet bez udziału człowieka, zaawansowana globalna biosfera, pokryta pleśnią lasów i robactwem  wielokomórkowców jest już na półmetku swojego istnienia. Za mniej niż miliard lat - mrugnięcie okiem w kosmicznej skali czasu-  ziemia stanie się jałowym pustkowiem spalonym przez puchnące w przedśmiertnych skurczach słońce. W tym czasie ilość cierpienia zdążyłaby się zwielokrotnić, zostawiając w tyle większość życia istniejącego do teraz, z którego w przybliżeniu 100% jest już martwe. Podczas gdy ilość cierpienia i niespełnienia zwielokrotni się, ilość całkowitego spełnienia pozostanie ta sama, nie będzie ono istnieć. W istocie wątpliwe jest, czy jakakolwiek ucieczka od pragnień jest nawet logicznie możliwa bez rezygnacji z istnienia, choć ich minimalizacja w formie bezcelowej technologicznej nirwany może być teoretycznie wykonalna. 

Nie widzę logicznego powodu zabraniajacego efiliście odrzucenie czystego metafizycznego pesymizmu, uznania, że pewne elementy życia maja wartość pozytywną, i że na przykład szczęście, rozumiane inaczej niż stan braku cierpienia i niespełnienia, maja wartość samą w sobie. Nie uważam takiego poglądu za dobrze uzasadniony, ale jest on w mojej opinii kompatybilny z pragnieniem zakończenia wszelkiego życia. 

Nie tylko oczywista metafizyczna negatywność istnienia kierowanego gradientem niespełnienia może być czynnikiem decydującym o przyjęciu efilizmu. Sama świadomość tego, jak tragiczne i nieskończenie niemal sadystyczne może okazać się przyszłe życie, w którym istnieje logiczna i, wydaje się, fizyczna możliwość powstania superinteligencji i symulacji, w których czujące istoty będą doznawały niewyobrażalnych i niemożliwych do zakończenia tortur, symulacji najgorszych piekieł i najokrutniejszych męczarni realizowanych kwadryliardy razy na septyliardach bytów nie są nierealną abstrakcją. Przeciwnie, mogą być tak realne, że nawet okruch ich realności spędziłby sen z powiek każdemu, kto przez choćby marny ułamek sekundy byłby w stanie wyobrazić sobie je z wystarczającą żywością. 

Wyobraź sobie zamknięte pomieszczenie, w którym twoje ciało ma sztucznie zwiększone odczuwanie bólu, i w którym sadystyczna istota powoli, pozwalając co zachować świadomość i wszechogarniający terror, przypala Cię i rozrywa, odrywa po kawałku strzępy poparzonej skóry, wykłuwa oczy i wsuwa pokryte kwasem ostrza we wszystkie otwory twojego ciała. Mówiąc o niewyobrażalnym cierpieniu nie myślę o odległych krzykach skazanych, ale o pogrążonych w rozrywającej rozpaczy ciałach, które nie mogą umrzeć i nie mogą uciec, przez wieczność. Nawet samo istnienie ryzyka, że coś takiego stanie się kiedyś choćby jednej istocie, i choćby za cenę wiecznego spełnienia dla reszty kosmosu, jeśli alternatywą jest nieistnienie, sprawia, że tworzenie potencjału do takich zdarzeń jest dla mnie nie do przyjęcia.

Niezależnie od tego, jak daleko w pozorne abstrakcje zagłębimy się w naszych przewidywaniach oraz pod jakim kątem oceniamy superinteligencję, przyszłą socjologię czy transhumanizm, efilizm bez wątpienia będzie stawał się tylko powszechniejszy, jeśli, jak uważam, jest racjonalnym poglądem mającym silne oparcie w rzeczywistości, a zapobieganie cierpieniu jest uniwersalnie wyznawaną wartością.  Efilizm, którego wymownym źródłosłowem jest życie czytane od tyłu, jest kolejnym ogniwem łańcucha rozumu, mozolnie rozpoznającego życie jako coś negatywnego - nie dającego nawet metafizycznej możliwości całkowitego i stabilnego spełnienia,  a powodującego cierpienia i dyssatysfakcję. Thomas Ligotti w swoim "Spisku Przeciwko Ludzkiej Rasie" określa je jako "malignantly useless", myślę że "tragically useless" oddaje naturę życia w podobnie wymowny sposób

Efilizm twierdzi zatem, ze niecierpienie jest wartością, że czujące życie, biologiczne, wirtualne czy technologiczne, z całym swoim bagażem dyssatysfakcji, realizowanego i potencjalnego bólu, rozpaczy i cierpienia, wraz z niemożliwością osiągnięcia ostatecznego spełnienia, nie jest warte trwania i kontynuowania, i że najetyczniejszym rozwiązaniem jest wyeliminować je, na wieczność lub na tak długo jak to możliwe, z kosmosu.