On Promortalism

 

Promortalism is a philosophical view that ceasing to exist is always a positive phenomenon. It recognizes that to cease to exist is always better for the individual than existence. In fact, although philosophical promortalism always sees cessation as desirable from a selfish point of view, nowadays, promortalism also seems to describe the notion that there are situations in which it is selfishly profitable to continue to exist. The original promortalism, propagated by Jihwoon Hwang, makes it clear that ending existence is always better for the individual than continuing life, and that, assuming annihilationism, therefore assuming that death is annihilation, it is always individually more profitable to choose an earlier death.

I consider such absolute promortalism to be a logically coherent view, well-argued, and deeply rooted in pure existential pessimism. Jiwoon Hwang himself took his own life in his early twenties, as did the 19th-century philosopher Philip Mainlander (at the age of 34), and probably like dozens of others who did not consider propagating that philosophy worth their time.

Existential pessimism, in a way that seems to be rooted in our current understanding of a cosmos, claims that neither life nor conscious existence has any value in itself, the absolute of existence is a state devoid of ultimate meaning and purpose. There is a lack of fulfillment in the lives of sentient beings due to constant needs and desires, so existence is a state of constant existential dissatisfaction. All actions are motivated by needs that potentially never end, and meeting and satisfying them is necessary to get rid of negative sensations such as boredom, emptiness, despair, and suffering. All pleasant states can be brought down to reducing this existential, metaphysical dissatisfaction. Desires can be seen as undesirable in itself, as in tranquilism, or as the immediate cause of suffering, which is bad in itself. On the first assumption, promortalism becomes legitimate and rational as long as there are desires or potential for them to exist, therefore, as far as we know, in absolutely every logically possible state of being. In the second case, if transhumanism and superintelligence could eliminate suffering and replace the gradient of dissatisfaction with a gradient of bliss, promortalism need not be obligatory if we consider pleasure or fulfillment to be good in itself. Even in such a scenario, however, there is a potential for suffering, so promortalism still seems a rational choice. In practice, I do not see a way to create any positive state in itself, the phenomenon of pleasure and fulfillment, even if they were the only states that exist, does not make the gradient of dissatisfaction something else by nature. The only thing that changes is the intensity of the metaphysical dissatisfaction felt. If we could make all minds immune to suffering, knowing absolutely nothing they feel is unpleasant, it would probably be a beautiful vision, but the state of being, with the existence of desires, would still be a metaphysically negative state. In this case, however, apart from the possibility of suffering, which is extremely important in practice, I do not think that it is a problem.

So far, however, transhumanism and the gradient of bliss on the desired level is a futuristic scenario, and the gradient of unpleasant dissatisfaction is responsible for the most actions in the life of sentient beings. By accepting the metaphysical view of reality postulated by existential pessimism and recognizing subjective fulfillment and non-fulfillment as a value, and it is in practice a value for every sentient being, life should be a state that does not bring and cannot bring anything different than, in the best scenario,  minimization of the ultimate existential non-fulfillment. The state of non-existence, usually equated with death, is neither negative nor positive by itself, it is a lack of any state, an abstract concept, but associated with a real physical possibility. Death, more specifically non-existence, is not a negative phenomenon, and since there is no positive phenomenon by nature, it is the best possible "state" because of its absolute neutrality and lack of any potential. Death is also not positive in itself, it is the termination and non-existence of negativity, which makes choosing it profitable from the perspective of the individual.

Both Schopenhauer and Mainlander, who considered themselves an intellectual heir of Schopenhauer, held the view that deficiencies and non-fulfillment are what exists in a "positive" way, the nature of all feeling is only different levels of lack and non-fulfillment, resulting from the existence of unsatisfied and potentially impossible to satisfy cravings. The state of unsatisfied desires is an unfavorable condition. Jiwoon Hwang used Benatar's asymmetry argument in his defense of promortalism, which fit perfectly into that inspired by eastern religions' reasoning. The lack of pleasure is not bad in itself, it is never bad to deprive of pleasure or satisfaction a nonexistent being. On the other hand, the state of non-suffering is good even when there is no one to experience this suffering. In some sense, it is good strictly because of that. The argument from asymmetry is, in this sense and to some extent, a recognition of the metaphysical negativity of the essence of needs, and therefore an expression of metaphysical pessimism. And it certainly does not contradict it in any aspect. Benatar himself denies that it would lead to promortalism. This is due, in whole or in part, to the assumption that death is always a harm, and that longer life can be desirable.

Even if we consider death to be bad, which is not determined to be in full accord with the rest of Benatar's philosophy, and is certainly not obvious, death is also a necessity, it cannot be stopped, it can only be postponed. In case if it is a harm, a longer life adds only more harm to the one necessary.

This potential inaccuracy was noticed and described by Rafe McGregor and Ema Sullivan-Bissett in the article "Better No Longer to Be", in a transparent manner, pointing out the most important inaccuracies. To quote ...

"If one accepts Benatar’s asymmetry between pleasure and pain, then prima facie one ought to accept that suicide is always preferable to continued existence. The reason for this is straightforward: if Benatar is right that it is better never to have existed, then non-existence must still be preferable to existing even when the agent in question has been unfortunate enough to be brought into existence. When the agent ceases to exist the result is an absence of pain, which is good, and an absence of pleasure, which is not bad. This is the basic case for the claim that Benatar’s anti-natalism entails pro-mortalism" end of quote

Authors, neither of whom agree with the assumptions leading to promortalism, argue that the version of anti-natalism that results from accepting asymmetry, without making any additional assumptions, clearly implies promortalism. I don't see the need to make additional assumptions and that's why I believe it indeed the case.

In his description of promortalism, Johwoon Hwang, in fact, familiar with the mentioned article, presents an identical view. Quotes...

"David Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry of harms and benefits, when combined with (exclusively) hedonistic view of harms and benefits, entails pro-mortalism. Professor Benatar’s view that the absence of pleasure of who never exists does not deprive, while the absence of pleasure of who ceased to exist does deprive, has some absurd conclusions that judges which life is a preferable one differently in ‘present-‘ and ‘future-life cases’.[...]Benatar’s asymmetry should be applied to post-mortem nonexistence as well, [...]so long as one’s remaining life will contain any pain, it is always preferable to cease to exist than to continue to exist." 

"Rather than thinking the pro-mortalist implications as a reductio, believe in a soundness of pro-mortalism"

For those unfamiliar with Jiwoon Hwang's argumentation, a link to his essay is provided below.

http://jiwoonhwang.org/pro-mortalism/

Thus, in its pure form, promortalism states that existence is always a negative state and, hence, ceasing to exist is always in the interest of every individual. The sooner the less bad.

In theory, the statement that life is ultimately a negative state should include the notion that there are or may be metaphysically positive elements in life, but the danger of suffering is too high, especially including the risk of astronomical suffering, which makes life ultimately always unprofitable.

The future existence itself can be seen as creating new entities, specifically future versions of our present person, as argued by Jiwoon. It can be considered that the state of further life is comparable to the creation of new beings, assuming empty individualism it could be even identical with that. In both cases, new experiences are created, new observer moments, exposed to suffering and guided by a pointless gradient of dissatisfaction. As Jiwoon Hwang describes it:

"One can think each moment one wakes up from sleep or every second of her life as an axiological equivalent of cases of coming into existence. Why should we treat the cases in which a person wakes up from unconsciousness differently from coming into existence? Moreover, in the intervening period of unconsciousness even needed? If not, we can construe each second of a person’s life as a new life, as a coming into existence. This might not be a very absurd view if we were to deny that one exists as a distinct metaphysical self (personal identity) that does not change over time. One can prevent one’s future self from coming into existence by death."

In practice, paradoxically, promortalism is not the view that it is always a rational decision to kill yourself. The premise of moral solipsism does not seem very widespread, and certainly, if the value is to minimize harm, from a global perspective, the death of some individuals may not ultimately be profitable, even though most beings most certainly do more harm than they prevent. However, I would like to leave the question of practical moral solipsism and its relation to rationality unresolved for the time being.

Non-existence is always better for the one who ceased to exist. This does not mean, however, that the dying process is good. Contrary. While the fear of death may automatically be regarded as irrational, the fear of dying is entirely justified, as the very process of dying is perhaps one of the most unpleasant events for most beings who die consciously.

The altruistic reason for continuing existence is the desire to minimize the suffering in the world. Getting rid of and weakening some of the illusions that lead to an irrational evaluation of the world is very often a long and painful process. The feeling of moral responsibility for the way the world works, or a very strong desire to stop harm, is a very good rational reason for continuing a negative existence if it can be morally profitable. It is certainly a noble choice, and often more difficult than choosing not to exist.

I am not arguing that the altruistic reason is the most common or the most important motive for the continuation of existence by promortalists, both those declared and those presenting a promortalist worldview unaware of the rather sparsely used term. The irrational, natural, inborn, and perpetuated by society's will to live is, in my opinion, without a doubt the main reason for continuing to exist. The deep-seated optimism bias and "existence bias" seem to be completely inseparable from the views held by most of humanity regarding existence as something positive and worth living. Seeing life as worth continuing and enduring suffering, even though it is ultimately finite and pointless, is a simple and brilliant evolutionary mechanism for ensuring survival. But survival is not and has never been, the most important goal of sentient minds. Survival is the goal of the program that controls living organisms, the only, unconscious, function of the program, in the case of biological terrestrial life, it is DNA, is to prolong its own existence. A mind is merely a tool, programmed by genetics and psychology to facilitate the survival of the program. Although the mind's instrumental goal is also to prolong being, the primary goal is to be less dissatisfied less deprived, to fulfill emerging needs and desires, which temporarily reduces the gradient of dissatisfaction. It is not in the interest of the sentient mind in such an assumption to continue to exist, but only to eliminate the gradient of unfulfilled needs, thus reducing unmet needs to zero. In fact, the desire to live is inscribed in the human psyche, where intelligence and rationality are also only a tool for the realization of desires to reduce unfulfillment.

Regardless of the rationality of the motive, the lack of a strong, irresistible desire to die as soon as possible does not in any way interfere with the recognition of the rationality of promortalism. The human mind is not, was not intended to be, and never was fully rational, and since it has evolved as a means of facilitating survival, its effective creations must be compatible with this purpose to propagate. If full rationality does not ensure the program's survival, it is automatically disqualified as a mechanism useless for the program. Bounded rationality, with an overwhelming number of cognitive biases and defense mechanisms, is much more effective machinery. Knowledge of such a state of affairs is usually unable to create a need or a desire for death to a degree that would allow it to be realized. Emotional dependencies and addictions are what direct the mind to the greatest extent, usually making it difficult, and often impossible, to make wholly rational decisions. Phenomena with enormous emotional baggage, like death,  are usually those that are most difficult to approach in a rational manner, and the mere questioning of some unwritten views may expose you to social exclusion or cause remorse.

The decision to end own existence is also psychologically extremely difficult. Even though the amount of suffering prevented is usually less than that caused, the perception of suffering directly related to our death, felt by loved ones, is for some reason a sufficient argument to continue even a hopeless existence. Relative pleasure in life is another such reason, even in the case of promortalists it causes "procrastination of death". The lack of safe, non-severe, and non-threatening means available is another important aspect. The right to die, the right to cease existence is not widely recognized. Only a handful of countries and states make it possible to commit assisted suicide, and only in the most severe cases. There are no universal, professional ways to die a graceful death, but there is tragedy, brutality, and the danger of becoming disabled. The fact that this is a taboo subject discourages large-scale discussion of such issues.

I am the only promortalist known to me who sees another reason as relevant, and so far it seems to me unexistent in the wider debate. In practice, promortalism seems to presuppose an annihilationist interpretation of death, as it seems to be supported by physicalism. Death is understood as the annihilation of the mind, eternal and irreversible, the result of which is the state of non-existence, or rather the absence of any state. An alternative interpretation is not widely known and is rarely presented outside of religious dogma. While dismissing religious bias as absurd, at least two other interpretations seem compatible with physicalism. The simulation hypothesis may make the understanding of death as an exit from the simulation worth considering. However, the gradient of desires still seems to be indispensable, regardless of whether we do exist in a virtual or non-virtual world. Another death, absolute death, can occur after exiting the simulation, so abandoning the state of existence is still possible. The second, no less compatible with physicalism, but the more exotic scenario is the concept of multiverse immortality, both in the form of quantum immortality and big world immortality. After adopting a few assumptions, such as modal realism and copy-friendly theory of identity, the annihilation of subjectively continued experience becomes absolutely impossible. In such a scenario, the technological reduction of desires to a minimum in virtual worlds may be the only long-term solution. Achieving The Ultimate Indifference via future technology in the case of multiverse immortality is a topic for more attention. Promortalism, therefore, the recognition of non-existence as preferred over any state of existence is still a rational view, even if non-existence is not possible. This approach will not be discussed in greater detail here.

This material represents, in a highly non-exhaustive manner, my approach and understanding of the philosophy of promortalism. It seems to be the logical conclusion of the general message of certain currents of philosophical pessimism that life is ultimately a negative phenomenon. Promortalism claims that based on such facts it is always good for an individual to cease to exist. Always, Other things equal, the sooner the better. Promortalism does not mean a wish to die, and in the light of the objective irrationality of the human mind, it is hard for a rational person to consider a promortalist to be a hypocrite for not killing themself. Just as a heroinist wishing to quit drug addiction is not accused of hypocrisy when he fails to cut himself off the drug, the same way a living promortalist is not an intellectual paradox even if he's a moral solipsist. In the rejection of moral solipsism, any action that ultimately reduces the amount of lack and suffering is worthwhile, including continuing to exist for this purpose. For this reason, I completely advise against all promortalists who are not moral solipsists, and therefore deem the suffering of others to be truly morally significant, to end their existence if your existence is, or can be, morally profitable. Your life can be a decisive factor in the future of many.